Generate extra code to write profile information suitable for the analysis program prof (for -p) or gprof (for -pg). You must use this option when compiling the source files you want data about, and you must also use it when linking.

Add code so that program conditions are instrumented. During execution the program records what terms in a conditional contributes to a decision, which can be used to verify that all terms in a Boolean function are tested and have an independent effect on the outcome of a decision. The result can be read with gcov --conditions.

This option is used to compile and link code instrumented for coverage analysis. The option is a synonym for -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage (when compiling) and -lgcov (when linking). See the documentation for those options for more details.

Automatically convert relative source file names to absolute path names in the .gcno files. This allows gcov to find the correct sources in projects where compilations occur with different working directories.

Set the directory to search for the profile data files in to path. This option affects only the profile data generated by -fprofile-generate, -ftest-coverage, -fprofile-arcs and used by -fprofile-use and -fbranch-probabilities and its related options. Both absolute and relative paths can be used. By default, GCC uses the current directory as path, thus the profile data file appears in the same directory as the object file. In order to prevent the file name clashing, if the object file name is not an absolute path, we mangle the absolute path of the sourcename.gcda file and use it as the file name of a .gcda file. See details about the file naming in -fprofile-arcs. See similar option -fprofile-note.

When an executable is run in a massive parallel environment, it is recommended to save profile to different folders. That can be done with variables in path that are exported during run-time:

%p

process ID.

%q{VAR}

value of environment variable VAR

Enable options usually used for instrumenting application to produce profile useful for later recompilation with profile feedback based optimization. You must use -fprofile-generate both when compiling and when linking your program.

The following options are enabled: -fprofile-arcs, -fprofile-values, -finline-functions, and -fipa-bit-cp.

If path is specified, GCC looks at the path to find the profile feedback data files. See -fprofile-dir.

Register the profile information in the specified section instead of using a constructor/destructor. The section name is name if it is specified, otherwise the section name defaults to .gcov_info. A pointer to the profile information generated by -fprofile-arcs is placed in the specified section for each translation unit. This option disables the profile information registration through a constructor and it disables the profile information processing through a destructor. This option is not intended to be used in hosted environments such as GNU/Linux. It targets freestanding environments (for example embedded systems) with limited resources which do not support constructors/destructors or the C library file I/O.

The linker could collect the input sections in a continuous memory block and define start and end symbols. A GNU linker script example which defines a linker output section follows:

  .gcov_info      :
  {
    PROVIDE (__gcov_info_start = .);
    KEEP (*(.gcov_info))
    PROVIDE (__gcov_info_end = .);
  }

The program could dump the profiling information registered in this linker set for example like this:

#include <gcov.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

extern const struct gcov_info *const __gcov_info_start[];
extern const struct gcov_info *const __gcov_info_end[];

static void
dump (const void *d, unsigned n, void *arg)
{
  const unsigned char *c = d;

  for (unsigned i = 0; i < n; ++i)
    printf ("%02x", c[i]);
}

static void
filename (const char *f, void *arg)
{
  __gcov_filename_to_gcfn (f, dump, arg );
}

static void *
allocate (unsigned length, void *arg)
{
  return malloc (length);
}

static void
dump_gcov_info (void)
{
  const struct gcov_info *const *info = __gcov_info_start;
  const struct gcov_info *const *end = __gcov_info_end;

  /* Obfuscate variable to prevent compiler optimizations.  */
  __asm__ ("" : "+r" (info));

  while (info != end)
  {
    void *arg = NULL;
    __gcov_info_to_gcda (*info, filename, dump, allocate, arg);
    putchar ('\n');
    ++info;
  }
}

int
main (void)
{
  dump_gcov_info ();
  return 0;
}

The merge-stream subcommand of gcov-tool may be used to deserialize the data stream generated by the __gcov_filename_to_gcfn and __gcov_info_to_gcda functions and merge the profile information into .gcda files on the host filesystem.

If path is specified, GCC saves .gcno file into path location. If you combine the option with multiple source files, the .gcno file will be overwritten.

This option can be used in combination with profile-generate=profile_dir and profile-use=profile_dir to inform GCC where is the base directory of built source tree. By default profile_dir will contain files with mangled absolute paths of all object files in the built project. This is not desirable when directory used to build the instrumented binary differs from the directory used to build the binary optimized with profile feedback because the profile data will not be found during the optimized build. In such setups -fprofile-prefix-path=path with path pointing to the base directory of the build can be used to strip the irrelevant part of the path and keep all file names relative to the main build directory.

When compiling files residing in directory old, record profiling information (with --coverage) describing them as if the files resided in directory new instead. See also -ffile-prefix-map and -fcanon-prefix-map.

Alter the update method for an application instrumented for profile feedback based optimization. The method argument should be one of single, atomic or prefer-atomic. The first one is useful for single-threaded applications, while the second one prevents profile corruption by emitting thread-safe code.

Warning: When an application does not properly join all threads (or creates an detached thread), a profile file can be still corrupted.

Using prefer-atomic would be transformed either to atomic, when supported by a target, or to single otherwise. The GCC driver automatically selects prefer-atomic when -pthread is present in the command line, otherwise the default method is single.

If atomic is selected, then the profile information is updated using atomic operations on a best-effort basis. Ideally, the profile information is updated through atomic operations in hardware. If the target platform does not support the required atomic operations in hardware, however, libatomic is available, then the profile information is updated through calls to libatomic. If the target platform neither supports the required atomic operations in hardware nor libatomic, then the profile information is not atomically updated and a warning is issued. In this case, the obtained profiling information may be corrupt for multi-threaded applications.

For performance reasons, if 64-bit counters are used for the profiling information and the target platform only supports 32-bit atomic operations in hardware, then the performance critical profiling updates are done using two 32-bit atomic operations for each counter update. If a signal interrupts these two operations updating a counter, then the profiling information may be in an inconsistent state.

Instrument only functions from files whose name matches any of the regular expressions (separated by semi-colons).

For example, -fprofile-filter-files=main\.c;module.*\.c will instrument only main.c and all C files starting with module.

Instrument only functions from files whose name does not match any of the regular expressions (separated by semi-colons).

For example, -fprofile-exclude-files=/usr/.* will prevent instrumentation of all files that are located in the /usr/ folder.

Control level of reproducibility of profile gathered by -fprofile-generate. This makes it possible to rebuild program with same outcome which is useful, for example, for distribution packages.

With -fprofile-reproducible=serial the profile gathered by -fprofile-generate is reproducible provided the trained program behaves the same at each invocation of the train run, it is not multi-threaded and profile data streaming is always done in the same order. Note that profile streaming happens at the end of program run but also before fork function is invoked.

Note that it is quite common that execution counts of some part of programs depends, for example, on length of temporary file names or memory space randomization (that may affect hash-table collision rate). Such non-reproducible part of programs may be annotated by no_instrument_function function attribute. gcov-dump with -l can be used to dump gathered data and verify that they are indeed reproducible.

With -fprofile-reproducible=parallel-runs collected profile stays reproducible regardless the order of streaming of the data into gcda files. This setting makes it possible to run multiple instances of instrumented program in parallel (such as with make -j). This reduces quality of gathered data, in particular of indirect call profiling.

Enable Hardware-assisted AddressSanitizer for compilation of the Linux kernel. Similar to -fsanitize=kernel-address but using an alternate instrumentation method, and similar to -fsanitize=hwaddress but with instrumentation differences necessary for compiling the Linux kernel. These differences are to avoid hwasan library initialization calls and to account for the stack pointer having a different value in its top byte.

Note: This option has different defaults to the -fsanitize=hwaddress. Instrumenting the stack and alloca calls are not on by default but are still possible by specifying the command-line options --param hwasan-instrument-stack=1 and --param hwasan-instrument-allocas=1 respectively. Using a random frame tag is not implemented for kernel instrumentation.

Instrument comparison operation (<, <=, >, >=) with pointer operands. The option must be combined with either -fsanitize=kernel-address or -fsanitize=address The option cannot be combined with -fsanitize=thread. Note: By default the check is disabled at run time. To enable it, add detect_invalid_pointer_pairs=2 to the environment variable ASAN_OPTIONS. Using detect_invalid_pointer_pairs=1 detects invalid operation only when both pointers are non-null.

Instrument subtraction with pointer operands. The option must be combined with either -fsanitize=kernel-address or -fsanitize=address The option cannot be combined with -fsanitize=thread. Note: By default the check is disabled at run time. To enable it, add detect_invalid_pointer_pairs=2 to the environment variable ASAN_OPTIONS. Using detect_invalid_pointer_pairs=1 detects invalid operation only when both pointers are non-null.

Enable ShadowCallStack, a security enhancement mechanism used to protect programs against return address overwrites (e.g. stack buffer overflows.) It works by saving a functions return address to a separately allocated shadow call stack in the function prologue and restoring the return address from the shadow call stack in the function epilogue. Instrumentation only occurs in functions that need to save the return address to the stack.

Currently it only supports the aarch64 platform. It is specifically designed for linux kernels that enable the CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK option. For the user space programs, runtime support is not currently provided in libc and libgcc. Users who want to use this feature in user space need to provide their own support for the runtime. It should be noted that this may cause the ABI rules to be broken.

On aarch64, the instrumentation makes use of the platform register x18. This generally means that any code that may run on the same thread as code compiled with ShadowCallStack must be compiled with the flag -ffixed-x18, otherwise functions compiled without -ffixed-x18 might clobber x18 and so corrupt the shadow stack pointer.

Also, because there is no userspace runtime support, code compiled with ShadowCallStack cannot use exception handling. Use -fno-exceptions to turn off exceptions.

Note that sanitizers tend to increase the rate of false positive warnings, most notably those around -Wmaybe-uninitialized. We recommend against combining -Werror and [the use of] sanitizers.

While -ftrapv causes traps for signed overflows to be emitted, -fsanitize=undefined gives a diagnostic message. This currently works only for the C family of languages.

This option disables all previously enabled sanitizers. -fsanitize=all is not allowed, as some sanitizers cannot be used together.

This option forces GCC to use custom shadow offset in AddressSanitizer checks. It is useful for experimenting with different shadow memory layouts in Kernel AddressSanitizer.

Sanitize global variables in selected user-defined sections. si may contain wildcards.

-fsanitize-recover= controls error recovery mode for sanitizers mentioned in comma-separated list of opts. Enabling this option for a sanitizer component causes it to attempt to continue running the program as if no error happened. This means multiple runtime errors can be reported in a single program run, and the exit code of the program may indicate success even when errors have been reported. The -fno-sanitize-recover= option can be used to alter this behavior: only the first detected error is reported and program then exits with a non-zero exit code.

Currently this feature only works for -fsanitize=undefined (and its suboptions except for -fsanitize=unreachable and -fsanitize=return), -fsanitize=float-cast-overflow, -fsanitize=float-divide-by-zero, -fsanitize=bounds-strict, -fsanitize=kernel-address and -fsanitize=address. For these sanitizers error recovery is turned on by default, except -fsanitize=address, for which this feature is experimental. -fsanitize-recover=all and -fno-sanitize-recover=all is also accepted, the former enables recovery for all sanitizers that support it, the latter disables recovery for all sanitizers that support it.

Even if a recovery mode is turned on the compiler side, it needs to be also enabled on the runtime library side, otherwise the failures are still fatal. The runtime library defaults to halt_on_error=0 for ThreadSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, while default value for AddressSanitizer is halt_on_error=1. This can be overridden through setting the halt_on_error flag in the corresponding environment variable.

Syntax without an explicit opts parameter is deprecated. It is equivalent to specifying an opts list of:

undefined,float-cast-overflow,float-divide-by-zero,bounds-strict

Enable sanitization of local variables to detect use-after-scope bugs. The option sets -fstack-reuse to none.

The -fsanitize-trap= option instructs the compiler to report for sanitizers mentioned in comma-separated list of opts undefined behavior using __builtin_trap rather than a libubsan library routine. If this option is enabled for certain sanitizer, it takes precedence over the -fsanitizer-recover= for that sanitizer, __builtin_trap will be emitted and be fatal regardless of whether recovery is enabled or disabled using -fsanitize-recover=.

The advantage of this is that the libubsan library is not needed and is not linked in, so this is usable even in freestanding environments.

Currently this feature works with -fsanitize=undefined (and its suboptions except for -fsanitize=vptr), -fsanitize=float-cast-overflow, -fsanitize=float-divide-by-zero and -fsanitize=bounds-strict. -fsanitize-trap=all can be also specified, which enables it for undefined suboptions, -fsanitize=float-cast-overflow, -fsanitize=float-divide-by-zero and -fsanitize=bounds-strict. If -fsanitize-trap=undefined or -fsanitize-trap=all is used and -fsanitize=vptr is enabled on the command line, the instrumentation is silently ignored as the instrumentation always needs libubsan support, -fsanitize-trap=vptr is not allowed.

The -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error option is deprecated equivalent of -fsanitize-trap=all.

Enable coverage-guided fuzzing code instrumentation. Inserts a call to __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc into every basic block.

Enable dataflow guided fuzzing code instrumentation. Inserts a call to __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1, __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2, __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4 or __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8 for integral comparison with both operands variable or __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1, __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2, __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4 or __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8 for integral comparison with one operand constant, __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmpf or __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmpd for float or double comparisons and __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch for switch statements.

Enable code instrumentation of control-flow transfers to increase program security by checking that target addresses of control-flow transfer instructions (such as indirect function call, function return, indirect jump) are valid. This prevents diverting the flow of control to an unexpected target. This is intended to protect against such threats as Return-oriented Programming (ROP), and similarly call/jmp-oriented programming (COP/JOP).

The value branch tells the compiler to implement checking of validity of control-flow transfer at the point of indirect branch instructions, i.e. call/jmp instructions. The value return implements checking of validity at the point of returning from a function. The value full is an alias for specifying both branch and return. The value none turns off instrumentation.

To override -fcf-protection, -fcf-protection=none needs to be added and then with -fcf-protection=xxx.

The value check is used for the final link with link-time optimization (LTO). An error is issued if LTO object files are compiled with different -fcf-protection values. The value check is ignored at the compile time.

The macro __CET__ is defined when -fcf-protection is used. The first bit of __CET__ is set to 1 for the value branch and the second bit of __CET__ is set to 1 for the return.

For every logical test that survives gimple optimizations and is not the condition in a conditional branch (for example, conditions tested for conditional moves, or to store in boolean variables), emit extra code to compute and verify the reversed condition, and to call __builtin_trap if the results do not match. Use with -fharden-conditional-branches to cover all conditionals.

For every non-vectorized conditional branch that survives gimple optimizations, emit extra code to compute and verify the reversed condition, and to call __builtin_trap if the result is unexpected. Use with -fharden-compares to cover all conditionals.

Emit extra code to set booleans when entering basic blocks, and to verify and trap, at function exits, when the booleans do not form an execution path that is compatible with the control flow graph.

Verification takes place before returns, before mandatory tail calls (see below) and, optionally, before escaping exceptions with -fhardcfr-check-exceptions, before returning calls with -fhardcfr-check-returning-calls, and before noreturn calls with -fhardcfr-check-noreturn-calls). Tuning options --param hardcfr-max-blocks and --param hardcfr-max-inline-blocks are available.

Tail call optimization takes place too late to affect control flow redundancy, but calls annotated as mandatory tail calls by language front-ends, and any calls marked early enough as potential tail calls would also have verification issued before the call, but these possibilities are merely theoretical, as these conditions can only be met when using custom compiler plugins.

Disable -fharden-control-flow-redundancy in leaf functions.

When -fharden-control-flow-redundancy is active, check the recorded execution path against the control flow graph at exception escape points, as if the function body was wrapped with a cleanup handler that performed the check and reraised. This option is enabled by default; use -fno-hardcfr-check-exceptions to disable it.

When -fharden-control-flow-redundancy is active, check the recorded execution path against the control flow graph before any function call immediately followed by a return of its result, if any, so as to not prevent tail-call optimization, whether or not it is ultimately optimized to a tail call.

This option is enabled by default whenever sibling call optimizations are enabled (see -foptimize-sibling-calls), but it can be enabled (or disabled, using its negated form) explicitly, regardless of the optimizations.

When -fharden-control-flow-redundancy is active, check the recorded execution path against the control flow graph before noreturn calls, either all of them (always), those that arent expected to return control to the caller through an exception (no-xthrow, the default), those that may not return control to the caller through an exception either (nothrow), or none of them (never).

Checking before a noreturn function that may return control to the caller through an exception may cause checking to be performed more than once, if the exception is caught in the caller, whether by a handler or a cleanup. When -fhardcfr-check-exceptions is also enabled, the compiler will avoid associating a noreturn call with the implicitly-added cleanup handler, since it would be redundant with the check performed before the call, but other handlers or cleanups in the function, if activated, will modify the recorded execution path and check it again when another checkpoint is hit. The checkpoint may even be another noreturn call, so checking may end up performed multiple times.

Various optimizers may cause calls to be marked as noreturn and/or nothrow, even in the absence of the corresponding attributes, which may affect the placement of checks before calls, as well as the addition of implicit cleanup handlers for them. This unpredictability, and the fact that raising and reraising exceptions frequently amounts to implicitly calling noreturn functions, have made no-xthrow the default setting for this option: it excludes from the noreturn treatment only internal functions used to (re)raise exceptions, that are not affected by these optimizations.

Enable a set of flags for C and C++ that improve the security of the generated code without affecting its ABI. The precise flags enabled may change between major releases of GCC, but are currently:

-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3
-D_GLIBCXX_ASSERTIONS
-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero
-fPIE  -pie  -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now
-fstack-protector-strong
-fstack-clash-protection
-fcf-protection=full (x86 GNU/Linux only)

The list of options enabled by -fhardened can be generated using the --help=hardened option.

When the system glibc is older than 2.35, -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 is used instead.

This option is intended to be used in production builds, not merely in debug builds.

Currently, -fhardened is only supported on GNU/Linux targets.

-fhardened only enables a particular option if it wasnt already specified anywhere on the command line. For instance, -fhardened -fstack-protector will only enable -fstack-protector, but not -fstack-protector-strong.

Emit extra code to check for buffer overflows, such as stack smashing attacks. This is done by adding a guard variable to functions with vulnerable objects. This includes functions that call alloca, and functions with buffers larger than or equal to 8 bytes. The guards are initialized when a function is entered and then checked when the function exits. If a guard check fails, an error message is printed and the program exits. Only variables that are actually allocated on the stack are considered, optimized away variables or variables allocated in registers dont count.

Like -fstack-protector except that all functions are protected.

Like -fstack-protector but includes additional functions to be protected those that have local array definitions, or have references to local frame addresses. Only variables that are actually allocated on the stack are considered, optimized away variables or variables allocated in registers dont count.

Like -fstack-protector but only protects those functions which have the stack_protect attribute.

Generate code to verify that you do not go beyond the boundary of the stack. You should specify this flag if you are running in an environment with multiple threads, but you only rarely need to specify it in a single-threaded environment since stack overflow is automatically detected on nearly all systems if there is only one stack.

Note that this switch does not actually cause checking to be done; the operating system or the language runtime must do that. The switch causes generation of code to ensure that they see the stack being extended.

You can additionally specify a string parameter: no means no checking, generic means force the use of old-style checking, specific means use the best checking method and is equivalent to bare -fstack-check.

Old-style checking is a generic mechanism that requires no specific target support in the compiler but comes with the following drawbacks:

1. Modified allocation strategy for large objects: they are always allocated dynamically if their size exceeds a fixed threshold. Note this may change the semantics of some code.
2. Fixed limit on the size of the static frame of functions: when it is topped by a particular function, stack checking is not reliable and a warning is issued by the compiler.
3. Inefficiency: because of both the modified allocation strategy and the generic implementation, code performance is hampered.

Note that old-style stack checking is also the fallback method for specific if no target support has been added in the compiler.

-fstack-check= is designed for Adas needs to detect infinite recursion and stack overflows. specific is an excellent choice when compiling Ada code. It is not generally sufficient to protect against stack-clash attacks. To protect against those you want -fstack-clash-protection.

Generate code to prevent stack clash style attacks. When this option is enabled, the compiler will only allocate one page of stack space at a time and each page is accessed immediately after allocation. Thus, it prevents allocations from jumping over any stack guard page provided by the operating system.

Most targets do not fully support stack clash protection. However, on those targets -fstack-clash-protection will protect dynamic stack allocations. -fstack-clash-protection may also provide limited protection for static stack allocations if the target supports -fstack-check=specific.

Generate code to ensure that the stack does not grow beyond a certain value, either the value of a register or the address of a symbol. If a larger stack is required, a signal is raised at run time. For most targets, the signal is raised before the stack overruns the boundary, so it is possible to catch the signal without taking special precautions.

For instance, if the stack starts at absolute address 0x80000000 and grows downwards, you can use the flags -fstack-limit-symbol=__stack_limit and -Wl,--defsym,__stack_limit=0x7ffe0000 to enforce a stack limit of 128KB. Note that this may only work with the GNU linker.

Generate code to automatically split the stack before it overflows. The resulting program has a discontiguous stack which can only overflow if the program is unable to allocate any more memory. This is most useful when running threaded programs, as it is no longer necessary to calculate a good stack size to use for each thread. This is currently only implemented for the x86 targets running GNU/Linux.

When code compiled with -fsplit-stack calls code compiled without -fsplit-stack, there may not be much stack space available for the latter code to run. If compiling all code, including library code, with -fsplit-stack is not an option, then the linker can fix up these calls so that the code compiled without -fsplit-stack always has a large stack. Support for this is implemented in the gold linker in GNU binutils release 2.21 and later.

Functions default to strub mode disabled, and apply strictly the restriction that only functions associated with strub-callable modes (at-calls, callable and always_inline internal) are callable by functions with strub-enabled modes (at-calls and internal).

Restore the default stack scrub (strub) setting, namely, strub is only enabled as required by strub attributes associated with function and data types. Relaxed means that strub contexts are only prevented from calling functions explicitly associated with strub mode disabled. This option is only useful to override other -fstrub=* options that precede it in the command line.

Enable at-calls strub mode where viable. The primary use of this option is for testing. It exercises the strub machinery in scenarios strictly local to a translation unit. This strub mode modifies function interfaces, so any function that is visible to other translation units, or that has its address taken, will not be affected by this option. Optimization options may also affect viability. See the strub attribute documentation for details on viability and eligibility requirements.

Enable internal strub mode where viable. The primary use of this option is for testing. This option is intended to exercise thoroughly parts of the strub machinery that implement the less efficient, but interface-preserving strub mode. Functions that would not be affected by this option are quite uncommon.

Enable some strub mode where viable. When both strub modes are viable, at-calls is preferred. -fdump-ipa-strubm adds function attributes that tell which mode was selected for each function. The primary use of this option is for testing, to exercise thoroughly the strub machinery.

This option is only available when compiling C++ code. It turns on (or off, if using -fvtable-verify=none) the security feature that verifies at run time, for every virtual call, that the vtable pointer through which the call is made is valid for the type of the object, and has not been corrupted or overwritten. If an invalid vtable pointer is detected at run time, an error is reported and execution of the program is immediately halted.

This option causes run-time data structures to be built at program startup, which are used for verifying the vtable pointers. The options std and preinit control the timing of when these data structures are built. In both cases the data structures are built before execution reaches main. Using -fvtable-verify=std causes the data structures to be built after shared libraries have been loaded and initialized. -fvtable-verify=preinit causes them to be built before shared libraries have been loaded and initialized.

If this option appears multiple times in the command line with different values specified, none takes highest priority over both std and preinit; preinit takes priority over std.

When used in conjunction with -fvtable-verify=std or -fvtable-verify=preinit, causes debug versions of the runtime functions for the vtable verification feature to be called. This flag also causes the compiler to log information about which vtable pointers it finds for each class. This information is written to a file named vtv_set_ptr_data.log in the directory named by the environment variable VTV_LOGS_DIR if that is defined or the current working directory otherwise.

Note: This feature appends data to the log file. If you want a fresh log file, be sure to delete any existing one.

This is a debugging flag. When used in conjunction with -fvtable-verify=std or -fvtable-verify=preinit, this causes the compiler to keep track of the total number of virtual calls it encounters and the number of verifications it inserts. It also counts the number of calls to certain run-time library functions that it inserts and logs this information for each compilation unit. The compiler writes this information to a file named vtv_count_data.log in the directory named by the environment variable VTV_LOGS_DIR if that is defined or the current working directory otherwise. It also counts the size of the vtable pointer sets for each class, and writes this information to vtv_class_set_sizes.log in the same directory.

Note: This feature appends data to the log files. To get fresh log files, be sure to delete any existing ones.

Generate instrumentation calls for entry and exit to functions. Just after function entry and just before function exit, the following profiling functions are called with the address of the current function and its call site. (On some platforms, __builtin_return_address does not work beyond the current function, so the call site information may not be available to the profiling functions otherwise.)

void __cyg_profile_func_enter (void *this_fn,
                               void *call_site);
void __cyg_profile_func_exit  (void *this_fn,
                               void *call_site);

The first argument is the address of the start of the current function, which may be looked up exactly in the symbol table.

This instrumentation is also done for functions expanded inline in other functions. The profiling calls indicate where, conceptually, the inline function is entered and exited. This means that addressable versions of such functions must be available. If all your uses of a function are expanded inline, this may mean an additional expansion of code size. If you use extern inline in your C code, an addressable version of such functions must be provided. (This is normally the case anyway, but if you get lucky and the optimizer always expands the functions inline, you might have gotten away without providing static copies.)

This is similar to -finstrument-functions, but the profiling functions are called only once per instrumented function, i.e. the first profiling function is called after the first entry into the instrumented function and the second profiling function is called before the exit corresponding to this first entry.

The definition of once for the purpose of this option is a little vague because the implementation is not protected against data races. As a result, the implementation only guarantees that the profiling functions are called at least once per process and at most once per thread, but the calls are always paired, that is to say, if a thread calls the first function, then it will call the second function, unless it never reaches the exit of the instrumented function.

Set the list of functions that are excluded from instrumentation (see the description of -finstrument-functions). If the file that contains a function definition matches with one of file, then that function is not instrumented. The match is done on substrings: if the file parameter is a substring of the file name, it is considered to be a match.

For example:

-finstrument-functions-exclude-file-list=/bits/stl,include/sys

excludes any inline function defined in files whose pathnames contain /bits/stl or include/sys.

If, for some reason, you want to include letter , in one of sym, write \,. For example, -finstrument-functions-exclude-file-list='\,\,tmp' (note the single quote surrounding the option).

This is similar to -finstrument-functions-exclude-file-list, but this option sets the list of function names to be excluded from instrumentation. The function name to be matched is its user-visible name, such as vector<int> blah(const vector<int> &), not the internal mangled name (e.g., _Z4blahRSt6vectorIiSaIiEE). The match is done on substrings: if the sym parameter is a substring of the function name, it is considered to be a match. For C99 and C++ extended identifiers, the function name must be given in UTF-8, not using universal character names.